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Tethering Tibet: 
Recent Chinese Historiography and Liu Shengqi in Lhasa, 
1945-1949 
 
Adam Cathcart, University of Leedsi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Before Liu Shengqi (ḣ䲎⾪) became the early 35&¶V foremost historian of Tibet, he was an 
English-language secretary in Lhasa for the Nationalist *RYHUQPHQW¶V Commission on 
Mongolia and Tibet.  His travels and assessment of Han-Tibetan relations in and around 
Lhasa provide a unique perspective on 7LEHW¶V tenuous relationship with the Chinese 
central government from 1945 until 1949.  With the 2010 publication of Liu's recollections 
in Lhasa (in Chinese), a new window is opened on the literature on Tibet's history -- and 
assertions of Guomindang power in the region -- in the period just preceding the traumatic 
collision with Maoism.    
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The historical question of 7LEHW¶V administrative and cultural linkage to China prior to 
October 1950 is a matter of ongoing dispute.  As with other Tibetan historical topics which 
have garnered sustained attention from Beijing, the development of Chinese-language 
scholarship on this issue has reached a rather fecund status.ii  Unsurprisingly, the immense 
financial resources which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has poured into Tibetan 
history research have yielded a great deal of scholarly work which stresses a pattern of 
unremitting contact between the lamaist court in Lhasa and what is rather loosely called 
³WKH central government / ѝཞ᭯ᓌ´iii  The existence of this body of scholarship serves, in 
some ways, as a repository to be turned to in times of great stress.  When claims of the 
legitimacy of Chinese authority over Tibet are questioned internationally ± for instance, in 
the immediate aftermath of the Tibetan uprising of March 2008 -- the CCP can confidently 
hoist up a simplified historical interpretation that ³WKH Tibetans have always been a 
member of the Chinese family, and for 700 unbroken years since the Yuan dynasty, the 
Chinese central government has carried out effective governance over Tibet [Ӿݳᵍаⴤѝ
ཞ᭯ᓌޣⲴ亶൏㇑⨶@´iv  More importantly, such statements render 7LEHW¶V absorption into 
the PRC in 1951 by the CCP as the restoration of a long-standing status quo.  The CCP thus 
appears on the Tibetan scene as the smooth successor to thousands of years of dynastic 
history, not a group of radical atheists bent on the destruction of 7LEHW¶V sacred past.v  Die-
hard foreigners and recalcitrant Tibetans who refuse to accept the &&3¶V legitimacy in 
Tibet, rejecting the 3DUW\¶V rhetoric and achievements in the areas of modernization and 
economic development, ought properly to be stunned into silence when confronted with 
the picture of seven hundred years of continuous central government rule over Lhasa.vi 
 
Since the uprising (or, depending on the rhetorical orthodoxy being employed, the 
³ULRW´dongluan) in Lhasa of March 14, 2008, Party presses have been churning out a great 
deal of new information seeking to reinforce the &&3¶V claims to Tibet. (To date, Warren 
W. Smith appears to have made the most comprehensive summary and analysis of these 
materials.)  Treatments of the ³VHUI OLEHUDWLRQ´ of 1959 have been particularly prominent, 
emphasizing and enumerating the evils of the Tibetan aristocracy prior to 1959 to the 
extent that the PRC retroactively declared March 11 ³VHUI liberation GD\´vii  In addition to 
the standard range of social science and religious research, these texts include historical 
treatments of the Tibetan aristocracy prior to 1951 along with healthy helpings of photos 
from the CCP archives in Tibet.viii  Much more useful for mainstream historians are 
publications on the early 1950s.  A new bilingual book about Zhang Jingwu, the &&3¶V 
earliest and most significant administrator in Tibet, describes events of the early and mid-
1950s in a way that seems very much in keeping with Party scholarship on similar 
developments in Xinjiang at the time.ix  Melvyn *ROGVWHLQ¶V immense and authoritative The 
Modern History of Tibet, Volume 1: The Demise of the Lamaist State (originally published 
in English in 1989) has been available in Chinese since 2001, but it has been reprinted and 
is now widely available, if potentially stripped of its most colourful description of the 13th 
Dalai /DPD¶V warnings about the evils of communism.x  The appearance of these texts 
seems to be part of a larger effort to educate both foreigners and the Chinese public about 
Tibet, and to diffuse some new thinking or at least new sources about Tibetan history in 
the pre-1959 era.  That these efforts have been redoubled in the aftermath of the March 
2008 uprising in Lhasa now seems completely clear. Rather than sitting on its historical 
laurels and repeating the old slogans, the CCP has mobilized a wave of scholarship in the 
service of documenting and demonizing the old system while at the same time 
emphasizing the high respect with which Chinese bureaucrats from ³WKH FHQWHU´ have 
always regarded Tibetans and Tibetan culture.   
 
In these conditions, a conscious effort has been made by the CCP to revise the historical 
view of the Guomindang efforts in Tibet, making them no longer part and parcel of 
³IRUHLJQ LPSHULDOLVP´ but rather as part of the long sweep of Chinese power and influence 
exercised on the plateau. Seen benignly, this trend might be integrated into a broader 
societal and academic interest in the Republican era, as represented most attractively by 
the periodical Lao Zhaopian (Old Photographs). By the same token, the fecundity of the 
scholarship in terms of pure quantity is not to be confused with diversity of perspective. 
 
One of the most interesting themes that has arisen in recent years in the official study of 
Tibetology and Chinese foreign policy histories in China has been the recuperation and 
rehabilitation of the Republican period.  The CCP, in other words, is moving further away 
from the kind of previous Stunde Null interpretation of its own history where the 3DUW\¶V 
appearance in power swept away the past completely.  In the case of Tibet, the CCP has 
encouraged research into the earlier linkages, not demonizing Jiang Jieshi (hereafter 
Chiang Kai-shek) but seeking to promote the view ± ironically, almost identical to ChLDQJ¶V 
at the time ± that the various Guomindang missions to Tibet constituted, as one collection 
of documents indicates ³7LEHW¶V belonging to &KLQD´xi  It is somewhat irrelevant that Mao 
himself never appeared to contextualize his own Tibet policy by citing -LDQJ¶V prior actions, 
and that he really only said he was going to clean Guomindang influence out of Tibet ± 
such as it was -- in October 1950 when he wrote about &KLQD¶V justification for moving 
against resisting Tibetans in the vital eastern Tibetan crossroads city of Chamdo.xii What 
was inconvenient to mention in the 1960s has returned as a vital new pillar in the revised 
justification for Chinese central control over Tibet.  
 
To government-affiliated historians today, Guomindang missions to Tibet indicate &KLQD¶V 
concern for developments on the plateau, and, when simplified into documentaries or with 
the appropriate pictures, can be used to demonstrate that Tibet was not absent Chinese 
influence during the Republican period.  Among the examples raised most prominently 
were, in the wake of the warlord period and Tibetan-Chinese wars for control over Amdo in 
the early 1930s are the mission of Liu Manqingxiii, Huang 0XVRQJ¶V August-November 
1934 mission to mourn for the 12th Dalai Lamaxiv, and Shen 6KXOLDQ¶V 1944 mission.   
 
In January 2010, the Tibetology Publishing House put forth a collection of essays by Liu 
Shengqi in the form of short episodic memoirs. Liu had been stationed in Lhasa from 1944 
to 1949 as the English-language Secretary for various (Guomindang) Central Government 
organs and later became one of the foremost Tibetologists in the early PRC.xv  His lively 
biographical history which intersected with one of the major turning points in the modern 
history of the Tibetan plateau ± the fall from power of the Nationalist Party in mainland 
China.  He is therefore a figure of significance when attempting to unravel both what 
happened in Tibet at the end of the Chinese Republican era, but also in how 7LEHW¶V 
subsequent history was interpreted, as he himself was instrumental in crafting the 
distinctive CCP historiography on the Tibetan plateau.xvi   
 
/LX¶V own personal recollections do not contradict the basic fact that he was a low-level 
Nationalist official in Lhasa from 1944-1949, but they also remind us that much of the 
significant correspondence from Chongqing and then Nanking to Lhasa in those years 
passed through his hands.  How Liu ended up on the 1944 mission is of some interest.  
/LX¶V early interest in Tibet was sparked by a visit by the Panchen Lama to Hangzhou in 
1925.  His early career had brought him to England and India. Perhaps in a later article I 
will be able to delve more into his early life, and his treatment of the Reting conspiracy in 
Lhasa in 1947, which he wrote about extensively in journalistic style for publication in 
Shanghai.        
 
The following document dates from 1967, the height of the Cultural Revolution during 
which time traditional academics were under threat, often physically.xvii The context of the 
document is absent any annotation that it was a kind of personal confession.  In the three 
years prior to the Cultural Revolution, Liu had grown interested in Lamaism, but his 
publication stream on the subject was truncated by the emergence of the political struggle 
in Beijing and nationwide. 
 
Recollections of Liu Shengqi, 1967, Beijing 
 
The Mongolia-Tibet Commission was established in early 1934.  At that time the 13th Dalai 
Lama had just passed away, and the Nationalist Government sent the head of the 
Commission, Huang Musong, to Lhasa both to serve as a mourner and to revive the 
relations between the Central government and the Tibet local government which had been 
broken off by the Xinghai Revolution. After that, the Nationalist government was 
increasingly active in Lhasa, where they set up a telegraph service (under the 
Transportation and Communication Ministry), the Lhasa Primary School (under the 
Education Ministry), the Lhasa Survey Office (I believe under the Weather Bureau), and 
other organizations.   
 
The local Tibetan government acknowledged these organs of National Government. At the 
same time, the local Tibetan authorities were secretly cooperating with British imperialists, 
strictly controlling things, and would not let people from the [Chinese] interior come to 
Tibet; their control of Han people was particularly rigorous.  However, since Tibet and the 
motherland shared a long tradition of relations, there was no way to totally stamp it out. So 
there were always people coming to Tibet secretly, and the authorities could do nothing 
about it. Some National governors disguised themselves as businessmen from Xining or 
Kang District, or pilgrims on their pilgrimage and sneaked into Tibet. But those were 
exceptions. Once they entered Tibet, the local authority would take it as a fact and ZRXOGQ¶W 
look into it. But taking things on the whole, the Tibet local authority kept considerable 
strict surveillance on the border and roads, and they kept the national government at arm's 
length. This is a simple way of describing the background at the time that we went to Tibet.   
 
In 1944, the victory in the War of Resistance was in view, and Chiang Kai-shek sent Shen 
Zonglian to Tibet, in the hopes of planting a few seeds in the Tibet locality that with proper 
opportunities in the future would ripen and over time develop.  The Tibetan local 
government, along with local warlords and not a few Tibetan hard-liners, was resisting the 
Nationalist Government in Qinghai, Gansu, Kangba, and other provinces; this was ³IRUFHG 
LQWHJUDWLRQ´  
 
The Nationalist Government hoped to take advantage of the coming victory in the War of 
Resistance and the decline in British power during the Second World War as an 
opportunity, on the one hand to establish high-level contacts with powerful monks in 
Tibet, and on the other hand to sound out the British attitude, in order to gain some 
political capital on the subject of the Tibet problem diplomatically. 
 
Before Shen Zonglian (the head of the Commission) went to Tibet, Kong Qingzong, the 
head of the Office of Affairs in Lhasa, had made an enemy out of the local authorities and 
created a number of contradictions. He had alienated [the Tibetans] to the extent that both 
sides hardly had any communications since. Therefore once in Lhasa, Shen Zonglian tried 
to get back in touch with a lot of people by inviting people and sending out presents, and 
he tried hard to warm the relations between the two sides.  The Tibetan elites also knew 
that Shen Zonglian had come from the head [of the Nationalist Government], and their 
attitude totally changed, thereafter improving relations.  However, once it came to the 
essential issues of their discussion, things ZRXOGQ¶W work at all. 
 
For example, after all the coastal areas fell to enemy occupation,  the National Government 
wanted to use the name of the War of Resistance to get the Tibetans to agree to have a road 
built between India and Tibet, for the purpose of creating a communication line at  the rear 
area to the outside. However once this idea was proposed, the local Tibetan government 
opposed the idea immediately and refused to change one bit, and the National government 
had to give up. 
 
Again according to the later remarks of Chen Yangzhang (the secretary who in 1946 
replaced Shen as head of the delegation), at the time when Shen Zonglian went to Lhasa, 
the Nationalist Government planned to set up a telegraph, primary schools and a survey 
office for him to manage. They also wanted him to communicate with and manage other 
Nationalist offices in Tibet, but this stance was opposed by some people, and it created a 
struggle within the Nationalist Government, and nothing came of it.  This was the internal 
situation. 
 
As for dealing with British Imperialism, before entering Tibet from India, Shen Zonglian 
went to New Delhi to talk to Sir Olaf Caroe, a minister for the British Government in India. 
According to what Shen said about this conversation afterwards, Caroe told him that Britain 
though that &KLQD¶V National Government and the local Tibetan government had a 
relationship based on so-called ³UHOLJLRXV VRYHUHLJQW\´  After this Shen Zonglian went to 
meet with another head of British Imperialism who had invaded our Tibet, the British 
Government in ,QGLD¶V Administrator in Sikkhim, Sir Basil Gould, to get his views.  Gould 
expressed himself more straightforwardly, saying that negotiations should be based on the 
illegal Simila Conference, which was to say that the British Imperialist invasion attitude was 
not changed at all. Therefore the Nationalist Government had very little progress on the 
diplomatic front.   
 
Shen Zonglian went to Tibet from the autumn of 1944, and he left in the spring of 1946; in 
this period of more or less one year, the important things that happened were: 1) He broke 
the deadlock between the local government and the Commission, and maintained good 
relations with a portion of the Tibetan elites; 2) He worked to connect with the 
monasteries, and stopped the British primary school which had just opened in Lhasa for 
Tibetan nobles, and got it to close; 3) In early 1946, when he went back to Chinese interior 
China to report, he got the Dalai /DPD¶V older brother to go to the Chinese interior to 
study, but this resulted in the distancing of the Tibet local authority from the commission. 
Because of this, Shen did not come back to Lhasa, but he instead continued his work in the 
interior.   
 
According to my analysis now, the most important activities of our office in Tibet were of 
this type: 1) To represent the Nationalist Government in dealings with Tibetan local 
government, functioning as an organization of coordination. So we participated in Tibetan 
local important festivals, to maintain our traditional long-standing relationship; 2) To 
connect with elite monks, especially to especially to win over the monasteries to create 
success; 3) To manage some of the Han population of Lhasa and the affairs of the small 
number of Han monks in the city; 4) At the same time as influencing events, to send 
reports on the Tibetan situation back to the Nationalist Government; 5) Maintain relations 
with Britain (and afterwards India), Nepal and other FRXQWU\¶V representatives and 
organizations in Lhasa, including handling matters dealing with visas and documents 
along the Indian border.   
 
In 1944, I went with Shen Zhonglian together with a total of 14 people to Tibet, a list of 
whom follows: 
 
Shen Zonglian (the head of the Mongolia-Tibet Commission), Chen Xizhang (the head 
Secretary who became head of the office after Shen left in 1946) and his wife Zhao Keren and 
daughter Chen Jiwen, Zhiyi (a doctor whose surname I GRQ¶W recall) and his wife Song 
Manchun, Li Youyi (Section Chief) and his wife (I FDQ¶W recall her name; she died during 
childbirth not long after arrived in Lhasa), myself Liu Shengqi (English language secretary), 
assistant directors Li Maoyu and Li Tangyan, two cooks surnamed Qian, and Chen 
Changsheng (Chen =RQJOLDQ¶V duty stuff).  
Among these 14 people, four of them were family numbers, three were assorted assistants, 
and Ge Chengzhi was a professional doctor, and was in charge of a medical clinic after 
arrived in Lhasa. Li Tangyan was an assistant manager at Central Trust Bank who intended 
to investigate the financial situation in Lhasa via the opportunity of coming to Tibet with 
Shen Zonglian. He accompanied us but was mainly preparing to set up the bank, and was 
going back to interior China soon, and was thus not included in the formal organization. Li 
Maoyu was the only staff member of the Commission, but upon his arrival he claimed that 
he couldn't adjust himself to the highlands climate physically, and was sent back to 
Chongqing after about two or three months. Therefore, the staff who remained and were 
actually engaged in practical work were only four: Shen Zonglian, Chen Xizhang, Li Youyi 
and myself.  
 
There weren't many original staff members in Lhasa in the first place, and most of them 
went back to the interior of China with the former head of Commission, Kong Singsong, who 
held a post in the Mongolia-Tibet Committee. The only one who stayed on was the secretary 
for Tibetan language, named Li Guolin. There was also an interpreter called Zhang Wang, 
and a clerk called Mi Hui. Besides these people, there was a section chief stationed in 
Chengdu, named Zuo Zenji. At that moment, it took almost a month by horse from Chengdu 
to Lhasa. The whole communication system [of the commission] was done through 
telegraph. Zuo Zenji had never been to Lhasa, so I had never seen this man. The rest were 
assorted assistants.  
 
This situation went on for almost a year until we had another four or five staff members 
arrive in succession. However, the organization of the commission was never very formal, 
and the division of work was not very clear neither. 
 
Back then there was no post service between Lhasa and the interior of China; all mail was 
transferred from India. It took three months on a single trip to go to places like Kangding 
(Tib.: Dardo) and Xining. The communication was therefore mainly reliant on the telegraph 
bureau in Lhasa established by the Ministry of Transport.  All matters, big or small, were 
coded in telegraphs. Code was also used to exchange telegraphs with Nationalist 
Government Consulate in India. Otherwise, we had to wait until someone reliable came 
around and entrust our mail to them, but this happened only once every several months. 
 
I didn't plan to stay very long in Tibet. I came because I couldn't find an ideal job during the 
War of Resistance, and so, having been introduced by my classmate Tang Shao, went to Tibet 
with Shen Zonglian. My plan was to save some money and collect some materials which I 
could write about, in the hope of going to the United States to study journalism and 
ultimately change my job.  
 
My main job was to manage the documents from Great Britain, India, and Nepal, and so on, 
and interpret during social occasions. It wasn't much work. But because there ZHUHQ¶W 
enough staff members at the commission, I would help them out sometimes. So I began to 
help them translate the telegraphs. The official documents of the commission with other 
locations were through telegraphs, and we had them every day -- some days more, and on 
other days less. The more important documents were given to Shen Zonglian and Chen 
Xizhang to deal with; I would translate those were given to me, or cooperated with Chen 
Xizhang to translate some occasionally. The codes that I saw and used, were common codes 
which had been adapted. In total, I helped to translate telegraphs like this for more than half 
a year. 
 
Shen Zonglian had just arrived at Lhasa, and therefore, according to my memory, at that 
time almost all of the telegraphs that I had translated were words of social interaction, such 
as regards, congratulations, reports of safe arrivals, etc. I remember that I had seen Chiang 
Kai-shek, Chen Bulei, and others sending him regards about his journey, and also saw some 
social telegraphs (about when he would assume the post, or congratulations) from some 
warlord types, such as Liu Wenhui, Ma Bufang, Huang Zhengqing. Moreover, besides those 
to the Mongolia-Tibetan Commission, we also had contacts with ministry of foreign affairs, 
ministry of education, ministry of transport, ministry of Finance, and the high  
representative office at India dispatched by the Nationalist Government, and also consulate 
general.  
At that time, I basically paid little attention to my translation work, as I thought it was rather 
a mechanical task; they wanted me to translate telegraphs, but how many times were their 
requests disdainful of my true talents? My help was automatic because it stemmed from a 
voluntary spirit. After a while, I felt bored when they asked me to translate the telegraphs. I 
thought, ³, came to Tibet to be a secretary. They asked me to translate the telegraphs 
blindingly now, what else would they ask me to do in the IXWXUH"´ At the beginning, I told  
Chen Xizhang, that translation should not be part of my work. I wrote my objections down, 
and I showed my determination by once using illness as an excuse when they asked me to 
translate telegraphs again. Therefore, they never asked me to translate anymore. After the 
summer of 1945 when Liu Yugong, Liao Luxiang and others came, the translation work was 
handed over to them and Chen Xizhang.  
I refused to translate telegraphs -- but Shen Zonglian did not mind, which was a reason I 
believed he was an enlightened director. 
The Lhasa Club (Ch.: Lasha lianhuanshe) was founded in the early 1946. From 1946 to the 
end of 1947, I was elected as the secretary-general for two years. 
Around 1944, when the Japanese imperialist aggression pressured Burma, there was a batch 
of overseas Yunnan Chinese who came to Tibet from Burma.  Most of them stuck together 
in the Lhasa, and they were youths. They suggested setting up a club for entertainment.  A 
noble of Tibet, called Samdrup Podrang (who later became the Deputy Commander of the 
Tibetan Military Area after Liberation) agreed to construct a place for it.xviii In the end of 
1945, the house was built. 
In 1945, after the victory of the War of Anti-Japanese Resistance, most of those overseas 
Yunnan people went back to Burma to do business, and nobody cared much about the Club 
anymore. It was said that Samdrup Podrang complained that ³<RX Chinese only have five-
minutes of passion to do anything! I have built the house, while you guys GLGQ¶W care about 
it anymore, etc.´  When the remaining Yunnan businessmen heard those remarks, they held 
a conference in the commission, since everyone thought it was not good for local impressions 
[of Han Chinese]. Then they decided to organize the Club to regain some social credit. I had 
attended this conference as well. The <XQQDQ¶V businessmen, Li Heren, Ma Yicai and so on 
to be the directors. I was selected as the secretary-general. The secretaries I can remember 
were the sports secretary Xiao Chongqing and the finance secretary Yan Jun. 
Part of the members in the Club were businessmen from Yunnan. The Beijing businessmen 
were not warm toward the Club. Others were officials. At the beginning, the number of the 
Club members was fifty or sixty. But since the Burma Chinese had left one by one, the 
number kept going down. The other Chinese wereQ¶W interested in the activities anymore and 
only paid the membership fee. Meanwhile, there were no Tibetans who joined us. 
The funds of the Club began out of the celebration of the War of Anti-Japanese Resistance. 
When we won war, everyone was exciting and donated money to celebrate the victory for 
three days. The remaining money was used as the fees for first organizing when the Club was 
set up. After establishment of the Club, in order to collect funds we borrowed old films and 
a projector from the commission and showed a film twice, charging ticket fees to collect 
revenues. The funds of the Club also depended on membership fees.  
In the Club, we had basketball, volleyball, a ping-pong room, a common room, a small 
refectory. The playground and the refectory were used more often than the others. At the 
beginning, because it was a fresh thing, many people came here. It was particularly attractive 
for Tibetans when the games started. In the end, it lost popularity. 
Although the outside of the Club was built up, there was not much inside; it looked like a 
stadium in the interior of China. The Chinese living in Lhasa were not interested in sports, 
and, after a while, the attitude of people turned cold. Occasionally, the students and teachers 
in Lhasa would come to play basketball in there. 
To support it was becoming a burden for us, but no one said we should close it. Actually, the 
function of the Club was: firstly, to offer a place for the commission to held the meetings. 
The space of the commission was narrow and small. When organizing meetings, we need to 
use the corridor but it was not big enough. We could use the FRPPLVVLRQ¶V playground to 
hold the meetings, like the Double Ten Festival and the New <HDU¶s Day, and it was normal 
to celebrate on the playground. Secondly, it was convenient for primary schools in Lhasa to 
hold their sports classes. The pupils used the playground a lot. Thirdly, there were some 
people who entertained the guests in there some times, but not often. Fourthly, it could be 
used to organize games and have some fun once in a while. In the end of 1947, I made my 
mind up not to stand for secretary-general in the voting, and I never managed it after that. 
Attitudes toward the Club were mixed, and the community did not speak with one voice. 
Shen Zonglian was supporting it. But after setting it up, he went back to the interior. He told 
me once, that the main opinion and collective wish was for him to organize the club, so he 
needed to be responsible for it. The Club could support some occasional entertainment 
events. If Tibetans would attend, it would be a good way to connect each other. But the slaves 
of Tibetan nobles got into trouble easily, and Tibetan soldiers were especially terrible and 
undisciplined; they always looked for trouble after drinking. Some Lamas were not easy to 
deal with as well. But the Club was a mass organization, with fresh things like basketball and 
volleyball and Tibetans were allowed to come in. If incidents occurred, the commission could 
not control them and would lose face. Therefore, Chen Xizhang did not endorse this kind of 
³extra business.´ Since it was already build up, the Club was left on its own to live or die. 
I also remember that in 1947, there was a guy called Jiang Xinxi who stayed in one room of 
the Club for a few months because he FRXOGQ¶W find a place to live. 
 i  An earlier version of  this paper was presented at the MCAA/Himalayan Studies Conference at 
Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota in 2011. Research funding was provided by the Wang Center 
for International Education at Pacific Lutheran University, and a trip to Lhasa (and an apartment in 
Chengdu) was kindly arranged by 3/8·V Greg Youtz. The staff  of  the Tibetology Research Center at 
Sichuan University provided able assistance during various stays in Chengdu. In Leeds, William Critchlow 
(now pursuing an M.A. at the University Nottingham) turned up to help with pre-submission copy 
editing. Wankun Li provided essential help in completing the section of  the translation describing the 
´/KDVD &OXEµ and in checking other Chinese idioms.    
 
ii A good indication of  the &&3·V attention to the internationalization of  the Tibet issue, and its efforts 
to inflect the Western scholarly discourse on Tibet, is the journal Zhongguo Zangxuebao, the flagship official 
journal for Tibet Studies in China, which now has an English version in which selected articles are 
translated.  
 
iii Funding in 2009 for what was rather loosely described as ´SUHVHUYDWLRQ and research of  Tibetan culture 
and KLVWRU\µ ran to at least 200 million RMB, according to 35&·V Information Office of  the State 
&RXQFLO·V White Paper: Fifty Years of  Democratic Reform in Tibet (Beijing: March 2009). <http://www.china-
un.org/eng/gdxw/t539939.htm>, accessed 18 November 2016.  
 
iv Shu Zhisheng, Introduction to Tibet: Past and Present (Beijing: Sanlian Chubanshe, 2008), pp. 1, 143.  
Echoing precisely the language of  the opening of  the 2009 State Council Report on Tibet, the 
spokesperson for the PRC Embassy in London asserted in November 2016 that ´µ  For a critique of  this 
stock assertion, see Warren W. Smith, 7LEHW·V Last Stand? (Rowman & Littlefield, 2010).  For the letter 
itself, see Zeng Rong, ´&KLQHVH Policy is Modernising 7LEHWµ The Guardian (published letter), November 
10 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/10/chinese-policy-is-modernising-tibet>, 
accessed November 18 2016.  
 
v For CCP efforts to counteract this perception and educate cadre working in Tibet on religious issues, 
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